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Comments
Peter Finkle & Morguard Investments Limited:
Simon Coakeley* Reforming Federalism
from the Top
I. Introduction
Nations are not only unified markets, but usually they are at least that. In
most discussions about national unity, adequate account is taken of the
importance of the free movement of goods, capital and people. Rarely,
though, does the discussion encompass the necessity of legally assuring
such movement in the domestic marketplace through the practical
modality of secure remedies for breaches of obligations in contracts and
tort.' De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd2 is a landmark decision by
the Supreme Court of Canada that considers the extent of jurisdiction
that provincial courts may exercise and the associated concern with the
enforceability of judgments issued by one provincial court in other
Canadian courts.3 This infrequently addressed aspect of national unity is
important not only because of its political dimensions but because it has
potentially significant effects on the nature and costs associated with the
Canadian domestic marketplace. To grasp fully the import of this
decision, it is necessary first to explore the relation between the security
of legal undertakings, usually in contract, and the existence and efficiency
of the marketplace for goods and services.
Without security of private contracts, it would be difficult to have a
national marketplace, or even local ones. The essence of the law of
contract, upon which the marketplace depends, is the ability of
contractors to obtain redress for a breach of the terms of their agreements.
Without this inducement, the motivation to fulfil contracts is restricted to
the maintenance of future goodwill - a fragile thread when millions of
*Peter Finkle is with Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada and is an Adjunct Professor of
Law at the University of Ottawa Graduate School of Law where he has taught Conflicts of
Law. Simon Coakeley is a Master of Law student at the University of Ottawa Graduate School
of Law. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of
the Government of Canada.
1. See, for example, J. Swan, "The Canadian Constitution, Federalism and The Conflict of
Laws" (1985), 63 Can. Bar Rev. 271.
2. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (hereinafter cited as Morguard).
3. For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that there are no significant differences between
the provinces and the two territories, and references to provinces should be read as referring
to the territories as well unless the context clearly requires otherwise.
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dollars may be at stake. Rights without remedies may be important in
some contexts, but in the marketplace such rights are truly hollow. The
development and maintenance of a national or international marketplace
is, thus, closely related to the provision of contract remedies in situations
where a breach has occurred.
Where there are difficulties in securing a remedy for breach of
contract, the marketplace is likely to be less unified and potential
plaintiffs will attempt to overcome the risk of loss by various means.
These may include the use of insurance, various forms of performance
guarantees, complex legal arrangements and so forth; all of which
substantially increase costs associated with the underlying market
transaction. Despite problems faced by potential plaintiffs in breach of
contract situations, business will continue. Large players will transact
business in the most uncertain of situations because they can secure
themselves against risks. Small players, too, will continue to do business
in an uncertain market because of sheer necessity, but they will be unable
to secure themselves against these marketplace risks. Everyone, in the
end, loses because marketplaces characterized by legal (or other)
uncertainties are inherently inefficient and needlessly increase the costs of
doing business. In all business situations, as the perceived risks and
transactional costs increase, so must the potential profit margin.4
Another related aspect of this type of uncertainty arises in tort and
other proceedings. Actions in tort provide a different type of protection
from those in contract, but one that is as vital to the operation of a safe
and secure market. The uncertainties created by doubts as to the extent
of the jurisdiction that Canadian courts are able to exercise outside their
provinces and the enforceability of their judgments in sister provinces do
not contribute to market certainty. The same may be said for uncertainty
in other types of proceedings concerning personal status and obligations.5
An equally serious, though less tangible, concern addressed by the
Morguard decision involves the symbolic perception of Canada as a
federation. Pre-Morguard, judgments on actions in personam issued by
one provincial court were treated in theory, and often in practice, as
foreign judgments when offered to secure enforcement in other provincial
courts.6 Contrast this situation with the approach taken in the United
4. See generally the seminal work on this point of H. M. Markowitz, Economic Theory and
Portfolio Selection, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
5. While various techniques have been developed to ensure a degree of certainty in the case
of marriage, divorce, support payments and custody of children, the existence of these ad hoc
techniques serves to illustrate the nature of the problem. Succession to moveables, legal
inability, etc., are areas which would benefit from an enhanced degree of certainty.
6. Although all provinces, except Qu6bec, have passed Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
legislation, all these do is codify the common law, (see infra, text associated with note'16).
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States, Australia and other federations that require judgments from courts
in one regional unit of the federation to be afforded "full faith and credit"
in the courts of other regional units.7 Even in the European Community,
with its multiplicity of differing legal systems, "full faith and credit" is
provided for because it is a recognized aspect of harmonious and unified
economic relations. One stance symbolizes, and may actually involve, a
wary and distrustful attitude to the procedures and judgments of sister
provinces. The other symbolizes, and in most circumstances actually
insists on, acceptance of the procedures and judgments of courts in sister
states.
It is necessary to explore briefly the law in Canada pre-Morguard to
comprehend fully the revolution in perspective that this case embodies
for our legal system and the Canadian sense of federalism.
II. The Way We Were
The jurisdiction of Canadian common law courts, like their progenitors
7. In the United States, Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.
Section 1 of the XIVth Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1868, provides in part:
... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; ...
The effect of thesetwo provisions has been to place a constitutional limit on the exjuris, or
long-arm, jurisdiction of the States, under the XIVth amendment, while ensuring that resulting
judgments are- given effect throughout the United States. See, for example, World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson; 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559,62 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1980).
In Australia, section 54 of the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900 provides:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have the power to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(xxxiv.) The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal
process and the judgments of the courts of the States.
Section 118 provides:
Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public
Acts and records, and judicial proceedings of every State.
As a result of its powers under s. 54, the Commonwealth adopted the Service and Execution
of Process Act, 1901-1973, which provides for service of process throughout Australia.
The original member states of the European Community concluded the 1968 Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matter& As new states
have been admitted to membership in the Community, they have had to make arrangements
to join this Convention. It provides detailed rules which govern service of process on all
persons domiciled (Le. habitually resident) within a member state of the Community and
provides for the enforcement, throughout the Community, of all judgments issued in
accordance with the Convention.
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in England, is founded on a notion of territoriality. A judgment in rem
can be handed down by a common law court when the thing in question
is situated within the territorial limits of the court. In the case of
judgments in personam, the person against whom the judgment was
sought had also to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. While
it is an easy matter to determine whether a piece of land lies within a
court's territory, it is much less obvious when a person is involved. The
traditional common law approach has been that if a person is domiciled
(in the common law sense of the word) or served with originating process
within the court's territory, 8 or if the person attoms to the court's
jurisdiction - either by appearing or by having agreed to appear, as in
the case of a choice-of-court clause in a contract - then the court will
have jurisdiction over the case.
In limiting their jurisdiction to matters dealing with their own territory,
the English courts also effectively limited the jurisdiction of the courts of
other countries in a similar way. Although the English courts would not
automatically enforce foreign judgments in England, they would
entertain an action based on the foreign judgment against an English
defendant if the foreign court had obtained jurisdiction over the
defendant according to English rules. Although this sensibly recognised
the foreign court's jurisdiction over property located and persons
domiciled within its territory, unless the foreign court had been able to
effect service of process on a defendant domiciled in England while he
was within its territory, the English courts were of the view that any
subsequent proceedings could not be enforced in England.
Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, the somewhat fortuitous
nature of in personam jurisdiction, as commerce developed and persons
began to have greater contact with lands outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the English courts, it became difficult for the English courts
to dispense their brand of justice in situations which involved foreign
defendants. As a consequence, the in personam jurisdiction of the English
courts was modified by the Common Law Procedure Act9 which
permitted service exjuris with permission of the court. This principle has
been adopted by the Canadian common law jurisdictions and
8. See, for example, Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein, [1972] 2 Q.B. 283, [1972] 2 All
E.R. 689 (C.A.), where the English courts held they had jurisdiction to hear an action brought
by an Indian princess against an American art dealer, both resident in France, under a contract
made in France, on the grounds that service effected while the defendant was attending Ascot
races was sufficient to give the English courts jurisdiction. It should be noted that this would
likely no longer obtain now that the United Kingdom has implemented the Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, enacted by
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, c. 27 (U.K.).
9. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, ss. 18-19 (U.K.).
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considerably extended in many of them where service ex juris is
permitted as of right under the appropriate Rules of Court.10
Unfortunately, although not surprisingly, as the English courts began
to extend their jurisdiction to hear matters against persons who were not
physically in England at the time process was issued, they did not
recognize a similarly enhanced jurisdiction in the courts of other
territories. This almost astonishingly asymmetrical attitude became the
norm in Canadian common law courts.11 On the one hand the common
law courts claimed a virtually limitless jurisdiction while on the other,
they denied similar jurisdiction to the courts of other jurisdictions, no
matter what their legal system.
Regardless of whether service exjuris is permitted as of right or by
order of the court, proceedings related to the following factors-have been
recognized as being appropriate for service ex juri&s: property situated
within the province; acts, deeds, wills contracts, obligations or liabilities
affecting land within the province; relief sought against a person
domiciled or ordinarily resident in the province; administration of the
estate of a person domiciled in the province; execution of trusts or written
instruments dealing with property within the province, or which ought to
be interpreted according to the province's law; enforcement of a contract
made within the province, or made on behalf of a non-resident by an
agent within the province, or which is to be interpreted according to the
province's law, or a contract over which the province's courts have
jurisdiction; breach of contract within the province; a tort committed
within the province; an injunction to have effect in the province; a person
outside the province that is a necessary party to an action within the
province; an action brought 1py a mortgagee of property, other than of
land, for foreclosure, sale or delivery of possession; an action brought by
a mortgagor of property, other than of land, for redemption,
reconveyance or delivery of possession; proceedings founded on the
judgment of the courts of the province; matrimonial causes; proceedings
brought on a foreign judgment. The list is more than extensive.
Prior to Morguard, Canadian plaintiffs enjoyed, subject to the
discretion of the court, an almost unlimited opportunity to sue before
their own province's courts. 12 Provided the defendant had some assets or
other interests within the province, the winning plaintiff would probably
10. See, for example, Alberta Rules of Cour4 Alta. Reg. 390/68, s. 30 (with permission of the
court); British Columbia Rules of Court B.C. Reg. 221/90, R. 13; Rules of Civil Procedure,
0. Reg. 560/84, R. 17.
11. See, for example, the comments of La Forest J. at p. 12 of the typescripts in Morguard
See, also, New York v. Fitzgerald [1985] 5 W.W.R. 458, 148 D.L.R. (3d) 176 (B.C.S.C.).
12. A multitude of situations could be encompassed by the rather broad terminology of the
service exjuris provisions. For example, Ontario Rule 17.02(h) allows a plaintiff to serve ex
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obtain a judgment enforceable against the defendant. Defendants with no
interests in the province could usually ignore service exjuris, secure in the
knowledge that the courts of their own province would almost surely not
enforce the judgments of other courts (whether from another province or
another country) when those judgments were not issued by a court
exercising a valid in personam jurisdiction.
In order to limit the reach of their own exjuris rules and to afford
some protection to defendants, the courts developed techniques to enable
them to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction. The principal technique is the
doctrine of forum (non) conveniens. Under this doctrine a defendant may
argue that there is another jurisdiction that is at least as appropriate to
hear the matter as the one before which the plea is made. Recently, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia held:
The plea of forum conveniens is not merely that this Court is not a convenient
forum but that there is a more appropriate forum elsewhere. [Emphasis in
original.]' 3
The Ontario Supreme Court has also suggested that this is not an easy
test to meet:
Convenient forum means that the applicant must establish that the foreign
jurisdiction is the more appropriate natural forum to try the actions in the
sense that the foreign jurisdiction has the most real and substantial connection
with the lawsuit. [Emphasis added.]14
Unfortunately, defendants who appeared before the courts to contest
jurisdiction sometimes found that they had inadvertently submitted or
attorned to the jurisdiction of the very court they were contesting. s This
situation has been alleviated somewhat by provisions such as Rule 17.06
of the Ontario Rules of Court which provides that the recipient of an ex
juris service may appear to contest the Ontario court's jurisdiction
without having been held to attorn to the court.
In an apparent attempt to facilitate the enforcement of the judgments
of other courts, all the common law provinces have enacted Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments legislation. 16 While these Acts provide a more
juris for damages suffered within the province as a result of a tort or a breach of contract,
wherever committed; this effectively permits residents of Ontario to conduct their tort litigation
within their province, regardless whether it is the most logical jurisdiction.
13. Peterson et aL v. Ab. Bahco Ventilation et al (1979), 107 D.L.t. (3d) 49 (B.C.S.C.), at
59.
14. Galtaco Redlaw Castings Corp et at v. Brunswick Industrial Supply Co. (1989), 69 O.R.
(2d) 478 (S.C.), at 483.
15. See, for example, Henry v. Geoprosco International Ltd [1976] Q.B. 726, [1975] 2 All"
E.R. 702 (C.A.).
16. See, for example, Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act R.S.A. 1980, c. R-6; Court
Order Enforcement Ac4 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, ss. 30-41.7; Reciprocal Enforcement of
JudgmentsAc R.S.O. 1980, c. 432.
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effective means of registering judgments which courts enforce, they do
not extend the type or number of such judgments; all they tend to do is
codify the pre-existing common law. It should be noted, though, that
recognition of foreign divorces, support payments and child custody
awards, while not totally free of difficulty, are much more likely to be
enforced than other types of judgments. 17 Hence, recognition of other
provinces' judgments was granted or witheld as the various provincial
courts thought appropriate in various situations.
All of this changed on 20 December 1990.
III. De Savoye v. Morguard Investment Ltd et aLIs
The facts of this case are relatively simple. While resident in Alberta,
Douglas De Savoye guaranteed mortgages to four condominium units;
subsequently he became the mortgagor and the mortgages were assigned
to the plaintiffs. De Savoye moved to British Columbia and in 1985 the
mortgages fell into default. The plaintiffs commenced an action in
Alberta; an order for service exjuris was granted and service was effected
by double-registered mail. No defence was entered and default judgments
were granted, the effects of which were to cause a judicial sale, after
which there were deficiencies totalling approximately $30,000. The
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench issued judgments against De Savoye for
the deficiencies.
The plaintiffs brought actions on the judgments before the British
Columbia Supreme Court; judgment was granted,19 notwithstanding the
fact, as noted by La Forest J. in his judgment, that "The appellant took
no steps to appear or to defend the [Alberta] action. There was no clause
in the mortgages by which he agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Alberta court and he did not attorn to its jurisdiction. [Emphasis
added.]" 20 On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the
judgment was upheld.21 The defendant then appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada.
17. See, for example, Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act R.S.A. 1980, c. R-
7; Family Relations Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121, Part 4.1, ss. 70-70.93; ReciprocalEnforcement
of Maintenance Orders Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 433.
18. Supra, note 2.
19. Morguard Investments Limited v. De Savoye (1987), 18 B.C.L.R. (2d) 262, [1988] 1
W.W.R. 87 (B.C.S.C.).
20. Supra, note 2, at 1083.
21. Morguard Investments Limited v. De Savoye (1988), 27 B.C.L.R. (2d) 155, [1988] 5
W.W.R. 650,29 C.P.C. (2d) 52 (C.A.).
22. In light of the fact that this case appeared to be merely a private dispute, it is not surprising
that there were no appearances on behalf of the federal or provincial Attornies General. As will
become evident from the following discussion, in retrospect it is unfortunate that the Supreme
Court did not have the benefit of argument from such intervenors as the case has developed
into one with Constitutional implications.
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In determining that the time had come for Canadian law to change, La
Forest J. reviewed the historical roots of the English rules and noted the
fact that they had been "unthinkingly adopted by the courts of this
country, even in relation to judgments given in sister-provinces."23 This,
he concluded with surprising frankness, was a "serious error".24 In his
view, the courts must look to the underlying principles of private
international law, the rules of which are "grounded in the need in modem
times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines
in a fair and orderly manner."5 This flow of wealth, skills and people is
obviously of great importance to the Court as the notion is repeated in the
judgment and accommodating it is said to have "become imperative". 26
The traditional rules "fly in the face of the obvious intention of the
Constitution to create a single country,"27 one of the "central features [of
which] was the creation of a common market." 28
La Forest J. notes, as did the courts below, that all superior court
judges are appointed by the federal government and subject to the
superintending power of the Supreme Court, hence there can be no
concerns in the Canadian context about differing levels of justice between
the provinces; however he goes a step further and notes that superior
court judges "have superintending control over other provincial courts
and tribunals". 29 He also notes that there are other "sub-constitutional"
elements that ensure that the quality of justice does not differ across the
country, such as the fact that all "Canadian lawyers adhere to the same
code of ethics throughout Canada. '30
As a result, in La Forest J.'s view, the economic provisions of the
Constitution and the constitutional structure of the Canadian judicial
system make a Full Faith and Credit clause unnecessary in the Canadian
Constitution; the same effect as the ones in the constitutions of other
federations such as the United States of America or Australia can be
achieved by necessary implication of the current Constitution. Nor is
there any need for provincial agreement in the form of reciprocal
legislation along the lines of the European Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.31
23. Supra, note 2, at 1095.
24. IbM at 1098.
25. 1b at 1096.
26. /Md at 1098.
27. /IM at 1099.
28. /bid
29. 1b1W at 1100.
30. bid
31. See Supra notes 7, 8.
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La Forest J. asserts "the courts in one province should give full faith
and credit to use the language of the United States Constitution, to the
judgments given by a court in another province or a territory, so long as
that court has properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the
action. [Emphasis added.]" 32 This is to ensure fairness to the defendant,
which "requires that the judgment be issued by a court acting through fair
process and with properly restrained jurisdiction. '33
Fair process, it would appear, is not the same as due process under the
United States Constitution and it is expressly declared by La Forest J. not
to be an issue "within the Canadian federation", as there are sufficient
constitutional and sub-constitutional safeguards to ensure fairness.34 Fair
or due process is one thing, properly restrained jurisdiction is quite
another, though.
The basic reasoning of the British Columbia Court of Appeal was that
the province's courts ought to recognize the Alberta decision, because the
British Columbia courts would have exercised jurisdiction under similar
circumstances. As contemplated by the Court of Appeal, this would lead
to a reciprocity test: British Columbia courts would enforce Alberta
decisions where the basis of the Alberta court's jurisdiction was one the
British Columbia courts would recognize themselves and, presumably,
vice versa. Interestingly enough, La Forest J. rejects this: ".. . I do not see
the 'reciprocity approach' as providing an answer to the difficulty
regarding in personam judgments given in other provinces, whatever
utility it may have on the international plane. '35
With a nod of approval to Indyka v. Indyka,36 a review of Moran v.
Pyle National (Canada) LtdW led La Forest J. to adopt a "real and
substantial connection" test: Dickson J., as he then was, felt that the
existence of a real and substantial connection was the test to determine
whether the courts of a province were competent to hear a case in tort
when it was impossible to determine where the tort had actually taken
place. If a court were to gain jurisdiction on this basis, it would be
counter-intuitive to suppose that this would not also be sufficient to
ensure that the decision subsequently arrived at would be enforceable
before the courts of the other provinces and, as with tort, so with contract
and, presumably, with other matters as well.
32. Supra, note 2, at 1102.
33. kid at 1103.
34. Mdi- see supra p. 347.
35. bid at 1104.
36. [1969] 1 A.C. 33,[1967] 2 All E.R. 689 (HL).
37. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 586.
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Although La Forest J. seems to be primarily concerned with the
interests of the plaintiff, he is not totally oblivious to the interests of the
defendants and concludes:
It seems to me that the approach of permitting suit where there is a real and
substantial connection with the action provides a reasonable balance between
the rights of the parties. It affords some protection against being pursued in
jurisdictions having little or no connection with the transaction or the
parties ....
The private international law rule requiring substantial connection with the
jurisdiction where the action place is supported by the constitutional
restriction of legislative power 'in the province'. As Gurin J. observed in
Dupont v. Taronga Holdings.. .38 (translation) 'In the case of service outside
of the issuing province, service ex juris must measure up to constitutional
rules.' The restriction to the province would certainly require at least minimal
contact with the province, and there is authority for the view that the contact
required by the Constitution for the purposes of territoriality is the same as
required by the rule of private international law between sister-provinces 9
The existence of the various Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Acts in no way limits or is a substitute for the effects of what La Forest
J. announced. Indeed, in his view these Acts "simply [provided] for the
registration of judgments as a more convenient procedure than was
formerly available, i.e. by bringing an action to enforce a judgment given
in another province... There is nothing, then, to prevent a plaintiff from
bringing such an action and thereby taking advantage of the rules of
private international law as they may evolve over time. '40
IV. Unanswered Questions
While Morguard has answered some questions and set the Canadian
legal system on a new course, it necessarily leaves many questions
unanswered. The experience of the United States with their now
equivalent system requiring that sister-states' courts honour each others'
judgments suggests that two of these questions are of particular
significance. The first is the practical meaning of and limits to the "real
and substantial connection" test that the Court articulated as the
allowable limit for the exercise of out-of-province jurisdiction. The
second hard question is whether or not there are "public policy"
exceptions that provincial courts may call upon to avoid enforcing
judgments from sister jurisdictions which fly in the face of the legislative
policies of the receiving jurisdiction.
38. (1986), 49 DLR (4th) 335 (Que. Sup. Ct), at p. 339.
39. Supra, note 2,at 1108,1109.
40. bid, at 1111.
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La Forest J. briefly acknowledges that there are issues such as these
which will need to be resolved at some point. He holds out the possibility
that s. 7 of the Charter4 may come into play at some point and notes:
There are as well other discretionary techniques that have been used by courts
for refusing to grant jurisdiction to plaintiffs whose contact with the
jurisdiction is tenuous or where entertaining the proceedings. would create
injustice, notably the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the power of a
court to prevent an abuse of its process ....
There may also be remedies available to the recognizing court that may
afford redress to the defendant in certain cases such as fraud or conflict with
the law or public policy of the recognizing jurisdiction. Here, too, there may
be room for the operation of s. 7 of the Charter. None of these questions,
however, are relevant to the facts of the present case and I have not given
them consideration.42
V. Real and Substantial Connections: A Test with No Limits?
In the modem commercial world, are there any major Canadian
businesses that do not have a "real and substantial connection" with all
the provinces? Virtually all products, save those whose distribution is
restricted by government, move in interprovincial commerce. All major
producers, then, can reasonably anticipate that consumers throughout
Canada will have access to their goods in the normal course of business.
Presumably, on the basis of Morguard and its antecedent, Moran v. Pyle,
virtually all such businesses have a substantial connection to all
provincial jurisdictions regardless of the principal location of their
business. For normal commercial enterprises, there do not appear to be
any practical limits on the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by the courts
of any province in Canada.
It is possible to respond to this situation by nodding approvingly, but
there are implications. The result is not only to make the legal system
more procedurally convenient to plaintiffs, but possibly to skew it in a
substantive way that may be less obviously desirable. It is not only simple
convenience and lowered costs that prompt plaintiffs to commence
actions in their own home jurisdictions, it is also because they sometimes
believe that there is a better chance to win there. While this home-town
advantage in the legal game is not as documentable as that in hockey or
basketball, some believe that it exists, and not only in contract cases.
In a tort case for negligence between a local resident and a large
Ontario- or Quebec-based company, a jury or even a judge from a non-
industrialised province would be almost stone-like not to view the
41. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
42. Supra, note 2, at 1110.
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situation of their compatriot plaintiff with some special sympathy.
Indeed, partly out of concern for this possibility, the United States
Constitution created special access to a neutral, federal court jurisdiction
based on the diversity of state residency in the original suit.43 Without
attempting to document the costs to business, which may be impossible
to do in any case, one can still suggest that virtually unrestricted long-arm
statutes, combined with the associated requirement that full faith and
credit be given to judgments based on this type of jurisdiction, might have
a substantial impact on defendant businesses. In any case, business must
now face the prospect of long-arm jurisdiction made increasingly
effective because there is now less doubt about the enforceability of
judgments.
While there seem to be no predictable limits to the substantial
connection test in cases involving large businesses, the test may also
significantly expand provincial court jurisdiction over non-commercial
plaintiffs. In considering potential fact situations, it is difficult to imagine
a scenario where an actual connection between the plaintiff and the
province asserting jurisdiction would not be considered to be real and
substantial, and it is easy to imagine fact situations which involve
connections with different jurisdictions.
Automobile accidents provide the clearest examples of the possible
combinations of connections that can exist among plaintiffs, defendants
and provincial jurisdictions. They extend from the simplest situation,
where all elements connect with one and only one province to the most
complex, where an accident occurs between persons resident in different
provinces, in a third province, involving passengers or pedestrians
resident in another province, while driving vehicles rented in yet another
province. In such a situation, the courts of the jurisdiction in which the
accident occurred would see a real and substantial connection, as would
the courts of the provinces of residence of each of the parties. In an era
of state-funded medicare and other compensation schemes, the amount of
public money that is involved in caring for person seriously injured can
be substantial. 44
43. See Section 2 of Article III of the US Constitution. Australia has recently adopted
Commonwealth and State legislation to provide for a more coordinated approach to
jurisdiction over matters involving different territorial factors. See, for example, Jurisdiction of
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) and cognate legislation from the different States and
Northern Territory.
44. Ontario's current rules of court provide for jurisdiction where a plaintiff suffers damage
within the province regardless of where the tort or breach of contract occurred (Rule 17.02(h)).
The Ontario courts have held that this is sufficient to give them jurisdiction over automobile
accidents occurring outside the province with defendants who are not residents in Ontario. See,
for example, Grimes v. CloutieretaL (1988), 69 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
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Consider the possibility that two Qu6bec residents might have an
accident while driving their Quebec-registered motor vehicles in
Manitoba. It would be reasonable for the Manitoba courts to hold that
they had jurisdiction over subsequent litigation because there was a real
and substantial connection between the litigation and their province.
Hence, in line with the Supreme Court's reasoning, there would be no
constitutional impediment to the Qu6bec plaintiff commencing an action
against the Quebec defendant in Manitoba, nor would there be any
impediment to the Manitoba courts hearing the case, applying Manitoba
law on the lex locus delicti principle, and awarding money-damages for
pain and suffering, loss of future earnings, etc. in accordance with
Manitoba law. Even though Quebec takes a rather dim view of tort suits
in automobile accident situations, its courts may very well be called upon
to afford full faith and credit to such a Manitoba judgment.
VI. Public Policy Exceptions?
This, so far indeterminate, expansion of long-arm jurisdiction and its
associated constitutional requirement that provinces afford full faith and
credit to judgments from sister provinces, gives rise to the near certainty
that some provinces will be faced with judgments that offend their public
policy, as determined by their legislation. Obvious examples embodied in
the above hypothetical scenario, are raised by Qu6bec's longstanding,
and Ontario's recently adopted, public policy towards tort claims arising
from motor vehicle accidents.45 At an even more fundamental level,
common law and droit civil take diametrically opposed approaches to the
effect of contracts signed during a person's minority.46
Will provinces be forced to honour judgments that offend their public
policy and which are to be executed against their residents, conceivably
arising out of incidents that took place within the province? In the United
States some flexibility exists with regard to such situations.47
45. Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-25; Insurance Ac R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, as
am. S.O. 1990, c. 2.
46. While the common law takes the attitude that a contract signed by a minor is only
enforceable against him/her if it is ratified after the party has ceased to be a minor, droit civil
takes the attitude that a minor can only avoid contracts which are clearly disadvantageous to
him/her (Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 1002).
47. See, for example, Olshen v. Kaufman, 385 P. 2d 161 (1963); Lilienthal v. Kaufma, 395
P. 2d 543 (1964), Oregon Supreme Court. In these cases, an Oregon resident, who had been
found to be a spendthrift and for whom a guardian had been appointed, incurred debts outside
the state. Under Oregon legislation, such debts were voidable. The Oregon courts held that,
notwithstanding the validity of the debts in the states in which they were incurred, and
notwithstanding the valid interests those states had in upholding the debts, the Oregon courts
ought to apply the public policy of Oregon and the plaintiffs could not recover in Oregon.
Morguard Investments Umited
There is, so far, only a hint that the Court recognizes this type of
problem, and no suggestion what approaches to it their Lordships would
take. All of which is to say that there is work to be done in determining
the.limits to this formulation.
VII. Interesting Times
The restructuring of Canadian federalism has begun from on high. While
politicians and constitutional experts discuss constituent assemblies,
undertake endless consultations with the public and debate new ideas for
sharing powers, the Supreme Court of Canada has acted to provide a
new constitutional framework for Canadian law. Quietly; but with so-far
uncontested authority, the high court has changed important aspects of
the legal relations between sister provinces in ways that would probably
have been quite impossible during the normal course of constitutional
negotiations.
Would Quebec, or for that matter many other provinces, have agreed
to a system that, at first blush, requires their courts to honour judgments
that are in conflict with legislatively declared public policy in the
province? While the Court is legally on firm ground in that a
constitutional requirement that provincial courts give full faith and credit
to judgments from sister provinces makes good sense in a federation, the
political footing for such a decision may be somewhat slippery. How, in
the event, will provinces react when they discover that they are now
vulnerable to the imposition of judgments on their citizens which are
based on policies and laws which they may have specifically rejected but
which will be implemented through their courts?
Potential litigants, which includes us all, may be happy that a new
element of certainty and mobility has theoretically been given to the law
because of the adoption by the Court of the constitutional requirement
that provincial courts give full faith and credit to the judgments of other
provincial courts. On the other hand, it is conceivable that provincial
courts and, for that matter, provincial legislatures, may seek to avoid this
new constitutional rule and, in so doing, cast this entire aspect of the legal
system into disarray.
Similar uncertainties may accompany the adoption of the "real and
substantial connection" standard to determine the extent of jurisdiction
which provincial courts may assert beyond their borders. While
provinces probably may still use the doctrine of convenient forum to
avoid asserting this maximum level of jurisdiction, many courts at the
behest of plaintiffs who come before them will test the outward limits of
their jurisdiction. This may make for a plaintiffs' paradise or a balance
may be found between the interest of the plaintiff and that of the
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.defendant. At the moment, the words "real and substantial connection"
constitute a formula that is much like a new but empty pot: the Court in
its future decisions will determine whether the pot will be filled with a
witches' brew or a fresh-tasting, new stew.
A great Chinese philosopher said, perhaps ironically, "May you live in
interesting times". With the Morguard case, the Supreme Court of
Canada has assured itself that it will, indeed, live in interesting times. A
short-run political reaction to Morguard would certainly make for
interesting times. But even if that does not materialize, the Court in the
longer term must put flesh on the basic bones and structure it has created.
That, too, will make for interesting times.
